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AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION: SOLVING SOME 
UNFORESEEN PROBLEMS WITH THE 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 56 AND 
THE FEDERAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PROCESS 
Adam N. Steinman* 
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided three cases—Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Celotex v. Catrett, and Matsushita Electric v. Zenith Radio1—that 
transformed summary judgment from ―a disfavored procedural shortcut‖2 to 
a central feature of federal civil litigation.3  Summary judgment today is so 
important that federal courts have cited the three decisions in the 1986 tri-
logy more frequently than any judicial decisions in the history of American 
jurisprudence.4  For the first time since the trilogy (and indeed since the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure came into effect seventy years ago), the 
Civil Rules Advisory Committee has proposed a major revision to Rule 





  Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law 
(http://www.law.uc.edu/faculty/steinman.shtml).  Sincere thanks to Alan Morrison, Michael Solimine, 
Larry Solum, and Suja Thomas for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1
  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 
(1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
2
  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. 
3
  Whether the Supreme Court‘s summary judgment trilogy caused this shift or merely ratified one 
that had already occurred is an interesting question.  See Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich 
& David Rindskopf, A Quarter Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 862 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=914147 (―[C]hanges 
in civil rules and federal case-management practices prior to the trilogy may have been more important 
in bringing about changes in summary judgment practice.‖) (link); see also Gregory P. Joseph, Federal 
Litigation—Where Did It Go Off Track, LITIG., Summer 2008, at 132 (―Whether the Summary Judgment 
Trilogy is the cause or was an effect, there is no doubt that summary judgment has become a centerpiece 
of federal litigation over the past 25 years.‖). 
4
  Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Bur-
dens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 143 (2006).  
5
  See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 21–40 (May 9, 2008, as amended June 30, 2008) 
[hereinafter, COMMITTEE REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV_Report.pdf 
(link).  The last nontechnical revision to Rule 56 occurred in 1963 and involved fairly minor issues.  See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee‘s notes (1963 Amendment).  The public comment period for the 
current proposal lasts until February 17, 2009, after which the proposed amendments may be reconsi-
dered or revised.  See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amend-
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The aim of the Committee‘s proposal is laudable: ―to improve the pro-
cedures for making and opposing summary judgment motions, and to facili-
tate the judge‘s work in resolving them.‖6  It accomplishes this goal by 
adopting a ―point-counterpoint‖ process, similar to procedures that have 
been used in several federal districts via local rule.7  Under this process, the 
summary judgment movant must file a ―statement‖—separate from the mo-
tion and brief—that ―concisely identifies in separately numbered paragraphs 
only those material facts that cannot be genuinely disputed and entitle the 
movant to summary judgment.‖8  The nonmovant must then file a ―re-
sponse‖—separate from its brief opposing summary judgment—that ac-
cepts or disputes each of the facts in the movant‘s statement, and may also 
state ―additional material facts that preclude summary judgment.‖9  The 
movant must file a ―reply‖—separate from its reply brief—that accepts or 
disputes any additional facts stated by the nonmovant.10  In proposing this 
procedure, the Committee has wisely stated that ―no change should be at-
tempted in the summary judgment standard or in the assignment of burdens 
between movant and nonmovant,‖ preferring ―to leave these matters to con-
tinuing evolution under the 1986 Supreme Court decisions that have guided 
practice for the last twenty years and more.‖11 
This Essay identifies several problems with the proposed text that 
could have unfortunate consequences and contravene the Committee‘s in-
tent.  In particular, the proposed text can be read to make significant 
changes to the summary judgment standard and the burdens on litigants at 
the summary judgment phase.  At the very least, it may inadvertently dic-
tate questionable approaches to aspects of summary judgment procedure 
that have yet to be directly addressed by the Supreme Court.  Although the 
Committee‘s stated intent to retain the existing standard and burdens might 
spur courts to interpret the new text to avoid these ramifications, the safer 
                                                                                                                           
ments to the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Summary for Bench and Bar (August 2008), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/Brochure.pdf (link).  The Supreme Court must ulti-
mately approve any proposed amendments and transmit them to Congress by May 1, 2009; unless Con-
gress legislates otherwise, any amendments approved by the Supreme Court would take effect on 
December 1, 2009.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2006). 
6
  COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 21. 
7
  Id. at 25; see also id. at 28–30 (proposed Rule 56(c)(2)).  Current Rule 56 contains no particular 
procedure for presenting, opposing, and resolving summary judgment motions, see FED. R. CIV. P. 56 
(current version), and the Committee notes that this silence has led to local rules that ―are not uniform, 
and at times mandate practices that are inconsistent from one district to another.‖  COMMITTEE REPORT, 
supra note 5, at 21.  It is beyond the scope of this Essay to argue the merits of the proposed point-
counterpoint procedure, although I am inclined to agree with the Committee that the process is an im-
provement that will ―encourage well-founded motions and focused responses‖ and ―facilitat[e] well-
informed decision.‖  Id.  Rather, the focus of this Essay is to ensure that the process is codified in a way 
that does not inadvertently disturb other aspects of summary judgment procedure. 
8
  Id. at 28–29 (proposed Rule 56(c)(2)(A)(ii)). 
9
  Id. at 29 (proposed Rule 56(c)(2)(B)(i)–(ii)). 
10
  Id. at 29–30 (proposed Rule 56(c)(2)(C)(i)). 
11
  Id. at 21. 
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course is to revise the Committee‘s proposal before it is officially transmit-
ted in spring 2009.  Because the proposed amendments affect so critical an 
aspect of civil litigation as summary judgment, an ounce of prevention is 
especially well-advised. 
Part I of this Essay examines proposed Rule 56(c)(4), which addresses 
how parties must support the factual positions they express in their state-
ment, response, and reply.  Part II examines proposed Rule 56(c)(5), which 
authorizes parties to challenge the admissibility of their opponent‘s sum-
mary judgment material.  Part III points out a minor ambiguity in the pro-
posed rule concerning the standard for evaluating additional material facts 
asserted in the nonmovant‘s response.  Detailed suggestions for revising the 
proposed amendments appear in the Appendix to this Essay. 
I. PROPOSED RULE 56(C)(4): HOW PARTIES MUST SUPPORT THEIR 
FACTUAL POSITIONS 
Proposed Rule 56(c)(4) sets forth how litigants must support their fac-
tual positions at the summary judgment phase.12  It is a key feature of the 
proposed point-counterpoint process, particularly because the court may 
confine its inquiry to those ―materials called to its attention‖ under this pro-
vision (although it retains authority to consider other materials if it so 
chooses).13  There are a number of ways that courts might read proposed 
Rule 56(c)(4) as changing the summary judgment standard and burdens, 
contrary to the Committee‘s intent.14 
As an initial matter, the proposed amendments may inadvertently mod-
ify the summary judgment burden that applies to the party (typically the 
plaintiff) who will bear the burden of production at trial.  The text provides 
that parties may support their factual positions by ―showing . . . that an ad-
verse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.‖15  A 
plaintiff who bears the burden of production at trial, however, should never 
be able to support its factual position simply by showing that the defendant 
will not be able to produce admissible evidence to support its view of the 





  The proposed text reads:  
(A) Supporting Fact Positions. A statement that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed or is genuine-
ly disputed must be supported by: 
(i) citation to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, elec-
tronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for 
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or 
(ii) a showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine 
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. 
Id. at 30–31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A)). 
13
  Id. at 31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(B)).  
14
  See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing the Committee‘s intent that the proposed 
amendments leave the existing summary judgment standard and burdens intact).  
15
  COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A)(ii)). 
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lotex.  If the defendant can show that the plaintiff will lack sufficient evi-
dence to satisfy the plaintiff‘s burden of production at trial, the defendant 
need not ―support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials ne-
gating the opponent‘s claim.‖16  
The proposed rule could even allow a plaintiff to support summary 
judgment in its favor simply by showing that the defendant ―cannot produce 
admissible evidence‖ at trial.17  This would be a drastic change to current 
summary judgment burdens.  Even if the defendant (who ordinarily does 
not bear the burden of production for the elements of a plaintiff‘s claim) 
will have no admissible evidence it can use at trial, the defendant should 
prevail as long as the plaintiff fails to meet its burden of production.  The 
defendant‘s lack of evidence—standing alone—surely cannot be a sufficient 
basis for awarding summary judgment to the plaintiff. 
The proposed Advisory Committee Note correctly recognizes that only 
―a party who does not have the trial burden of production‖ should be able to 
rely on a showing that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evi-
dence at trial.18  This limitation, however, does not appear in the text of the 
proposed rule.  With so many judicial adherents to textualist methods of in-
terpretation,19 one cannot be sure that clarifications appearing in the Advi-
sory Committee Note or elsewhere in the drafting history will be an 
adequate solution.20 
Finally, proposed Rule 56(c)(4) might be read to inadvertently reduce 
the burden on defendants who file ―no-evidence‖ summary judgment mo-
tions (the kind endorsed in Celotex) that seek to show that the plaintiff will 
lack sufficient evidence to meet its burden of production at trial.21  Under 
the Committee‘s proposal, a movant can support its statement that a fact 
cannot be genuinely disputed with either ―citation to particular parts of ma-
terials in the record‖ or ―a showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce 
admissible evidence to support that fact.‖22  The implication is that a no-
evidence motion may properly proceed without any citation to materials in 





  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (emphasis in original). 
17
  COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A)(ii)). 
18
  Id. at 37 (emphasis added). 
19
  See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (―As we have 
repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other 
extrinsic material.‖) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1367). 
20
  See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Against Mere Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155, 167–71 
(2006) (expressing concern that courts will ―attend to the plain language of the restyled rules‖ rather 
than heed the drafters‘ intent that the recent restyling was ―intended to make no changes in substantive 
meaning‖). 
21
  Like the Committee Report, this Essay uses the phrase ―‗no-evidence‘ motion‖ to mean a sum-
mary judgment motion that is ―made by a party who does not have the trial burden of production‖ and 
that ―show[s that] the nonmovant has no evidence to support its position.‖  COMMITTEE REPORT, supra 
note 5, at 49. 
22
  Id. at 30–31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A)). 
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―showing‖ that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence, it 
would be a substantial change in current practice to suggest that this show-
ing can be made without supporting record materials.  Current Rule 56 au-
thorizes summary judgment only where the lack of a genuine issue is 
―show[n]‖ by the record materials.23  In Celotex, the Supreme Court in-
structed that even for no-evidence motions, ―a party seeking summary 
judgment always bears the initial responsibility of . . . identifying those por-
tions of ‗the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,‘ which it believes 
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.‖24 
Future courts might avoid these consequences, of course, by reading 
the proposed rule in conjunction with the Committee‘s desire not to change 
the current summary judgment standard or burdens.  But it is far from cer-
tain that judges would uniformly choose the uncodified intent of the pro-
posal‘s drafters over the literal text.25  The best solution, therefore, is to re-
restructure proposed Rule 56(c)(4) before it is finalized.  Detailed revisions 
are suggested in the Appendix to this Essay, but the basic requirements 
would be: (1) the summary judgment movant must identify in its statement 
the parts of the record on which it relies to show the absence of a genuine 
dispute as to any particular fact; and (2) if the nonmovant disputes that fact, 
it must identify in its response any additional parts of the record on which it 
relies to show the existence of a genuine dispute, or whether it simply be-
lieves that the movant‘s cited materials fail to establish the lack of a ge-
nuine dispute.  This approach will identify for the court the parts of the 
record on which each party relies for each factual issue.  Each side‘s argu-
ment as to whether a genuine dispute exists would be left to each side‘s 
summary judgment brief, and would be evaluated under the case law as it 





  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (current version). 
24
  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting the then-current version of Rule 56(c)).  In 2007, the nonsubs-
tantive restyling of Rule 56 revised the language quoted by the Celotex Court.  Current Rule 56(c) al-
lows summary judgment ―if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any 
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.‖  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (current version) (emphasis added). 
25
  See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text; see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (1997) (declaring that government by ―unex-
pressed intent‖ is ―tyrannical,‖ comparing it to Emperor Nero‘s practice of posting edicts high up on pil-
lars so they could not easily be read). 
26
  The revisions suggested in this Essay‘s Appendix also eliminate an ambiguity in the proposed 
text that could make the ―statement‖ and ―response‖ required under the point-counterpoint procedure 
more lengthy and complex than necessary.  The Committee Report suggests that each party must make 
its ―showing‖ about the presence or absence of a genuine dispute in its separate statement or response.  
See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 50.  Although the Committee stresses that ―[t]his showing is 
not an argument—arguments are to be made in the brief,‖ id., it is not clear how thorough the showing 
in the statement or response must be.  If parties perceive a need to include in their summary judgment 
statement or response elaborate and lengthy ―showing[s]‖ that essentially duplicate the arguments pre-
sented in their briefs, the efficiencies of the point-counterpoint procedure may vanish.  This Essay‘s 
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II. PROPOSED RULE 56(C)(5): ADMISSIBILITY OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MATERIALS 
Another area of concern is a new provision that a party ―may state that 
material cited [by the opposing party] is not admissible in evidence.‖27  Per-
haps this language is innocuous; authorizing a party to ―state‖ that material 
is inadmissible does not necessarily say anything about what sort of evi-
dence is or is not admissible for summary judgment purposes.28  The dan-
ger, however, is that the new provision could be read to require that 
summary judgment materials satisfy the admissibility standards that govern 
at trial.  The proposed Advisory Committee Note could even be read to 
suggest such a link.29  This issue is particularly important when a defendant 
files the kind of ―no-evidence‖ summary judgment motion that the Supreme 
Court approved in Celotex.  For such motions, the dispositive issue is often 
whether the plaintiff will have admissible evidence to support its position at 
trial.  The concern addressed here is whether the plaintiff‘s summary judg-
ment materials themselves must be in a form that would be admissible at 
trial. 
Lower federal courts today are divided on this question,30 and the Su-
preme Court has never endorsed the idea that summary judgment materials 
must satisfy trial admissibility standards.  To the contrary, the Court in Ce-
lotex stated: ―[w]e do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce evi-
dence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary 
judgment.‖31  At the summary judgment phase, the inquiry is whether the 
nonmoving party‘s materials, ―if reduced to admissible evidence, would be 
sufficient to carry [its] burden of proof at trial.‖32  The test is not whether 
the nonmoving party has presented materials that are already admissible 
evidence sufficient to carry its burden of proof at trial. 
Taken seriously, the idea that summary judgment materials must satis-
fy trial admissibility standards would make it improper for courts to consid-
                                                                                                                           
suggested revisions avoid this problem by clarifying that the statement and response need only cite to 
any record materials on which the parties rely for their factual positions.  This will allow the court to 
confine its inquiry to those cited materials, while leaving to the parties‘ briefs their precise arguments as 
to whether a genuine dispute exists. 
27
  COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(5)). 
28
  The Committee Report indicates that the impetus for this proposed language was that practition-
ers had ―asked for explicit direction on the proper formal procedure for presenting the position that ma-
terial cited to support a fact is not admissible in evidence.‖  Id. at 50. 
29
  Id. at 37 (―If a case goes to trial, failure to challenge admissibility at the summary-judgment stage 
does not forfeit the right to challenge admissibility at trial.‖). 
30
  See Steinman, supra note 4, at 121. 
31
  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added). 
32
  Id. at 327 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 
1524, 1542 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Celotex); DeBiasi v. Charter County of Wayne, 537 F. Supp. 2d 903, 
911–12 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (same); ERBE Electromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 529 F. Supp. 2d 
577, 586–87 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (same); Thomas v. City of Pittsburgh, 34 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969 (W.D. Pa. 
1999) (same). 
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er sworn affidavits by potential trial witnesses.  A party generally could not 
use such an affidavit as proof at trial because it would be hearsay—an out-
of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted.33  Yet 
Rule 56 has always contemplated use of such affidavits for summary judg-
ment purposes, to determine whether a genuine dispute indeed exists.34 
Indeed, subjecting summary judgment materials to trial admissibility 
standards may fundamentally misperceive how evidentiary rules apply to 
the summary judgment inquiry.  An out-of-court statement might be inad-
missible hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in that 
statement,35 but at the summary judgment phase the nonmovant does not 
need to prove the truth of the matter asserted; she need only show that a ge-
nuine dispute exists for trial.  If a party indicates an intent to call at trial the 
individual who made the out-of-court statement—and thus shows that what 
would otherwise be hearsay can be ―reduced to admissible evidence‖—then 
that statement is surely relevant to whether there is a genuine dispute.36  Of 
course, the material must be capable of being ―reduced‖ to admissible evi-
dence.  If the only witness who might testify to a particular fact at trial is 





  See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as ―a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted‖).  
Unlike testimony at a deposition, where there is an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, state-
ments in an affidavit are generally not covered by any exception to the hearsay rule.  Cf. FED. R. EVID. 
804(b)(1) (providing that prior testimony given at a hearing or deposition should not be excluded as 
hearsay if the declarant is unavailable and ―if the party against whom the testimony is now of-
fered . . . had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect ex-
amination‖); FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(1)(A) (providing that depositions may be used against a party at trial 
only if ―the party was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or had reasonable notice of 
it‖). 
34
  The Committee appears to recognize this tension in the ―Detailed Discussion and Questions‖ por-
tion of its Report, although the language it uses is somewhat ambiguous.  The proposed rule lists the 
types of evidence that may be considered at the summary judgment phase, namely ―depositions, docu-
ments, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made 
for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.‖  COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 5, at 30 (proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added)).  Discussing this provi-
sion, the Report explains that ―[i]t is important to carry forward the familiar authority to rely on affida-
vits or declarations because they otherwise might be excluded from consideration as inadmissible at 
trial.‖  Id. at 50 (emphasis added).  The italicized language suggests that summary judgment evidence 
might indeed be ―excluded from consideration‖ if it would be ―inadmissible at trial.‖  The Committee 
seems to presume, however, that the mere inclusion of affidavits in the list of summary judgment mate-
rials solves what ―otherwise‖ would be an inadmissibility problem.  But if the types of evidence enume-
rated in Rule 56 are per se admissible for summary judgment purposes, then it is unclear what would 
ever be a valid basis for ―stat[ing]‖ under Proposed Rule 56(c)(5) that material cited by the other side ―is 
not admissible in evidence.‖ 
35
  See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
36
  A court might not be able to predict with mechanical certainty whether information reflected in a 
summary judgment document will in fact be reduced to admissible evidence at trial.  But this is so even 
with the gold-standard of summary judgment material—a sworn affidavit from a witness with personal 
knowledge of the relevant facts.  For any number of reasons, that witness might testify differently at trial 
or might not be able to appear at all.  See Steinman, supra note 4, at 141–42. 
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other testimonial bar, then material reflecting what the witness‘s trial testi-
mony might have been could not create a genuine dispute.  The reason, 
however, is not that such material is inadmissible for summary judgment 
purposes.  The reason is that it would be impossible to reduce that material 
to admissible evidence at trial and, accordingly, such material cannot show 
that a genuine dispute exists.37 
Proposed Rule 56(c)(5) should be eliminated.  Rule 56 has never con-
tained general language regarding whether particular summary judgment 
materials are ―admissible in evidence.‖38  Adding a provision that could be 
read to impose admissibility requirements that defy the Supreme Court‘s 
explicit language in Celotex would contravene the Committee‘s guiding 
principle that any change to the existing summary judgment standard or 
burdens should be left ―to continuing evolution under the 1986 Supreme 
Court decisions that have guided practice for the last twenty years and 
more.‖39  Because the use of trial admissibility standards at the summary 





  See Steinman, supra note 4, at 128–31.  The analysis above focuses on materials used to rebut a 
Celotex-style ―no evidence‖ motion.  Trial admissibility standards may play a more direct role when the 
movant (whether plaintiff or defendant) seeks summary judgment based on affirmative evidence that its 
factual position is true, for example, by submitting material showing that the traffic light was in fact red 
or green when the defendant‘s car entered the intersection.  In this situation, the movant is using that ma-
terial ―to prove the truth of the matter asserted,‖ FED. R. EVID. 801(c), because such a movant satisfies 
the summary judgment standard only by establishing the truth of the matter beyond any genuine dispute.  
Yet even in this context, current practice does not fully incorporate trial admissibility standards.  As dis-
cussed supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text, affidavits are routinely used for summary judgment 
purposes, even though they are generally not admissible at trial.  Perhaps evidentiary flaws in the mo-
vant‘s material are more suitably resolved by the summary judgment standard itself, rather than by a 
separate inquiry into whether the material is ―admissible‖ for summary judgment purposes.  Imagine 
that a movant presents no sworn testimony by witnesses with personal knowledge of what color the traf-
fic light was, but seeks summary judgment based on a deposition where the deponent testifies that 
someone else had said that the light was green.  Even if the court may permissibly consider this testimo-
ny for summary judgment purposes, the hearsay problem may mean that the movant has failed to truly 
―foreclose the possibility‖ of a genuine dispute and, therefore, has not met the summary judgment stan-
dard.  Cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970) (holding that affidavits from two of the 
defendant‘s employees stating that they had not conspired with any policemen to refuse service to the 
plaintiff were insufficient bases for summary judgment because the affidavits ―fail[ed] to foreclose the 
possibility that there was a policeman in the Kress store . . . and that this policeman reached an under-
standing with some [other] Kress employee that [the plaintiff] not be served‖).  It is beyond the scope of 
this Essay to exhaustively explore the role of trial admissibility standards in different summary judgment 
situations; for this Essay‘s purpose, it is sufficient to note that significant open questions remain. 
38
  COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 31 (proposed Rule 56(c)(5)).  Rule 56 has always required 
that affidavits (but not other summary judgment materials) ―must be made on personal knowledge, set 
out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the 
matters stated.‖  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) (current version).  This language regarding affidavits has been re-
tained in the Committee‘s proposal.  See Committee Report, supra note 5, at 31–32 (proposed Rule 
56(c)(6)). 
39
  COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 21. 
40
  See Steinman, supra note 4, at 121. 
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the safer course is to leave Rule 56 silent on the admissibility issue (as it 
always has been).41 
III. ASSESSING ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS IDENTIFIED BY THE 
NONMOVANT 
One minor concern is how the proposed ―point-counterpoint‖ proce-
dure operates when the nonmovant identifies additional facts in response to 
a summary judgment motion.  Whereas the proposed rule states explicitly 
that the movant may assert ―only those material facts that cannot be ge-
nuinely disputed,‖ the rule does not address the standard for evaluating 
―additional material facts‖ asserted by the nonmovant.42  Because summary 
judgment is proper only when ―there is no genuine dispute as to any materi-
al fact,‖43 a nonmovant‘s additional fact should be accepted for summary 
judgment purposes as long as there is at least a genuine dispute about 
whether the fact is true.  Whether that fact indeed precludes summary 
judgment will depend on the circumstances of the case, but the fact cannot 
be ignored unless there can be no genuine dispute that the fact is false.  To 
avoid confusion on this issue, the proposed rule should explicitly recognize 
the standard for evaluating additional facts asserted by the nonmovant.  
Suggested revisions are set forth in the Appendix. 
CONCLUSION 
The potential problems with the proposed amendments to Rule 56 can 
be fixed with fairly modest redrafting.  There may be other ways to address 
these concerns; the specific revisions suggested in the Appendix are but one 
possible approach.  The goal of this Essay is simply to bring these concerns 
to the forefront, and to thereby encourage further consideration by the Ad-
visory Committee and the legal community before the amendments come 
into effect.  The Committee is to be commended for its excellent work on 
the proposed amendments, as well as its conscientious efforts to solicit 
comment from the legal community in accordance with the Rules Enabling 
Act.44  When it comes to a crucial issue like the summary judgment process, 
close vetting of proposed textual changes is essential to avoid the needless, 





  Eliminating proposed Rule 56(c)(5) would not prevent a litigant from arguing that her opponent‘s 
summary judgment material is inadmissible.  Such an argument could be raised in her summary judg-
ment brief (or reply brief). 
42
  COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 29 (proposed Rule 56(c)(2)(B)(ii), authorizing the nonmo-
vant to state ―additional material facts that preclude summary judgment‖). 
43
  Id. at 27 (proposed Rule 56(a) (emphasis added)); accord FED R. CIV. P. 56(c) (current version, 
authorizing summary judgment when ―there is no genuine issue as to any material fact‖). 
44
  See 28 U.S.C. § 2073; see also supra note 5. 




Following are suggested revisions to the Proposed Amendments to 
Rule 56 circulated by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee in its Report of 
May 9, 2008, as supplemented June 30, 2008.  Suggested additions to the 
Committee‘s proposal are marked in underline font.  Suggested deletions 
are marked in strikethrough font.  The suggested revisions are directed at 
sections (a) and (c) of the Committee‘s proposal. 
 
Proposed Rule 56(a): Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Sum-
mary Judgment.  A party may move for summary judgment on all or part 
of a claim or defense.  The court should grant summary judgment if the ma-
terials in the record—including depositions, documents, electronically 
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those 
made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, 
or other materials*—show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The court should 
state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion. 
 
Proposed Rule 56(c): Procedures. 
(1) Case-Specific Procedure.  The procedures in this subdivision (c) apply un-
less the court orders otherwise in the case. 
(2) Motion, Statement, and Brief; Response and Brief; Reply and Brief. 
 (A) Motion, Statement, and Brief.  The movant must simultaneously file: 
(i) a motion that identifies each claim or defense—or the part of each 
claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought; 
  (ii) a separate statement that concisely identifies in separately numbered 
paragraphs only those material facts that cannot be genuinely disputed 
and entitle the movant to summary judgment; and 
  (iii) a brief of its contentions on the law or facts. 






  This listing of materials is taken verbatim from proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A)(i).  The list is moved 
here in light of this Essay‘s suggested revisions to proposed Rule 56(c)(4).  This suggested approach 
parallels current Rule 56, which explicitly links the enumerated summary judgment materials with the 
general summary judgment standard.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (current version) (―The judgment sought 
should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.‖). 
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  (i) must file a response that, in correspondingly numbered paragraphs, 
accepts or disputes—or accepts in part or disputes in part—each fact in 
the movant‘s statement; 
  (ii) may in the response concisely identify in separately numbered para-
graphs additional material facts—as to which there is at least a genuine 
dispute—that preclude summary judgment; and  
  (iii) must file a brief of its contentions on the law or facts. 
 (C) Reply and Brief.  The movant: 
  (i) must file in the form required by Rule 56(c)(2)(B)(i), a reply that, in 
correspondingly numbered paragraphs, accepts or rejects—or accepts in 
part and rejects in part—to any each additional facts stated by the non-
movant opposing party under rule 56(c)(2)(B)(ii); and 
  (ii) may file a reply brief. 
(3) Accept or Dispute Generally or for Purposes of Motion Only.  A party 
may accept or dispute a fact either generally or for purposes of the motion on-
ly. 
(4) Citing Support for Statements or Disputes of Fact; Materials Not Cited.** 
(A) Supporting the Movant’s Statements of Fact.  For each fact the movant 
identifies in its Rule 56(c)(2)(A)(ii) statement, the statement must cite to 
particular parts of materials in the record that show the absence of a genuine 
dispute as to this fact. 
(B) Disputing the Movant’s Statements of Fact.  For each fact that the op-
posing party‘s response disputes—or disputes in part—under Rule 
56(c)(2)(B)(i), the response must either: 
  (i) assert that the materials cited in the movant‘s statement fail to estab-





  This Essay‘s suggested sub-sections (A)–(D) of Rule 56(c)(4) would replace the Committee‘s 
proposed Rule 56(c)(4)(A), which reads:  
(A) Supporting Fact Positions. A statement that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed or is genuine-
ly disputed must be supported by: 
(i) citation to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, elec-
tronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for 
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or 
(ii) a showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dis-
pute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. 
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  (ii) cite to particular parts of materials in the record that show the pres-
ence of a genuine dispute as to this fact; or  
  (iii) both (i) and (ii).  
(C) Supporting the Opposing Party’s Additional Statements of Fact.  For 
each additional fact that the opposing party identifies under Rule 
56(c)(2)(B)(ii), the response must cite to particular parts of materials in the 
record that show that there is at least a genuine dispute as to this fact. 
(D) Disputing the Opposing Party’s Additional Statements of Fact.  For 
each additional fact that the movant rejects—or rejects in part—under Rule 
56(c)(2)(C)(i), the movant‘s reply must either: 
  (i) assert that the materials cited in the opposing party‘s response fail to 
establish that there is at least a genuine dispute as to that fact; or 
  (ii) cite to particular parts of materials in the record that show that there 
is no genuine dispute that this fact is false; or  
  (iii) both (i) and (ii). 
(B)(E) Materials Not Cited.  The court need consider only materials called 
to its attention under Rule 56(c)(4)(A)–(D), but it may consider other mate-
rials in the record: 
  (i) to establish a genuine dispute of fact; or 
  (ii) to grant summary judgment if it gives notice under Rule 56(f). 
(5) Assertion that Fact is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence.  A response 
or reply to a statement of fact may state that the material cited to support or 
dispute the fact is not admissible in evidence. 
(6)(5) Affidavits or Declarations.  An affidavit or declaration used to support a 
motion, response, or reply must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts 
that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is 
competent to testify on the matters stated. 
*  *  * 
